

Cognitivism, Environmental Ethics and Environmental Aesthetics

In light of Allen Carlson's advocacy of cognitivism I would like to consider the intersection of environmental aesthetics and moral value. My hope is to address the strengths of Carlson's approach and to make headway in discussions concerning the relationship between environmental beauty and duty. In section one I consider Carlson's cognitivism and his argument that large-scale farms, when viewed correctly, are rich in aesthetic value. This sets the stage for my consideration, in section two, of what bearing Carlson's environmental aesthetic has on environmental ethics. Finally, in section three I consider two criticisms advanced by Emily Brady, one that pertains to cognitivism and another that pertains to her moderate autonomism.

I

Briefly, Carlson draws on Kendall Walton's argument concerning appropriate criticism of works of art and extends it to environmental aesthetics.¹ Walton argues that in order for appropriate criticism of works of art to advance, the relevant stylistic categories must be taken into account. That is, it would be inappropriate to judge Picasso's *Les Femmes d'Alger* (1907) as an Impressionist painting for doing so would ignore the different conventions, practices, and standards that distinguish Cubism and Impressionism, respectively.

Carlson applies this to environmental aesthetics by stressing that a landscape or (natural object within a landscape) must be judged in light of the natural category that it instantiates. It would be inappropriate to hold a swamp to the standard set by a majestic glacier valley since doing so would inevitably lead one to an arbitrary and unfair judgment. Indeed the swamp must

¹ See "Nature, Aesthetic Judgment, and Objectivity" in Allen Carlson, *Aesthetics and the Environment: The Appreciation of Nature, Art and Architecture* (New York: Routledge: 2002), pp. 54-71. For Walton's argument see "Categories of Art" in *Philosophical Review* 79 (1970), pp. 334-367.

be evaluated on its own terms, that is, in light of the natural category that it instantiates.

When judging a work of art, one must be informed about the relevant stylistic conventions, practices and standards and this seems to pose a problem for Carlson's environmental aesthetic for such factors are affairs of culture. Indeed, cognitivism holds that appreciation proceeds in the same fashion in natural and cultural contexts since, in either case, the goal is to judge the aesthetic object on its own terms however, how does one go about judging landscapes (and the natural objects that populate them) on their own terms when there are no stylistic considerations to take into account?

One option is to appeal to the social customs that inform environmental values however, Carlson observes that such customs should not be relied upon since they are often arbitrary in that they often ignore the objective characteristics of landscapes and natural objects that they appraise. For example, it is customary to view the natural environment primarily through the lens of the "picturesque" and doing so can entail that one not appreciate non-picturesque natural environments (such as swamps and bogs) and objects (such as a rotting carcass) that can be seen as being aesthetically valuable if they are seen for what they are. Rooting environmental aesthetics in social customs provides some degree of objectivity to aesthetic judgments (and thereby avoids subjectivism) however, it does not go far enough as social customs develop and are often applied unreflectively. Construing environmental aesthetic goodness in terms of the picturesque is questionable both because doing so applies a rather arbitrary cultural aesthetic category to the landscape and because it hinders appreciation of landscapes and natural objects on their own terms.²

In order to avoid this problem, Carlson suggests that aesthetic judgment is appropriately

² See Carlson (2002), pp. 3-5, 41-53.

objective when it draws on scientific knowledge and knowledge of natural history.³ That is, an understanding of environmental science can ground aesthetic judgment since it draws attention to the objective elements, processes, and histories that constitute environments. Cognitivism avoids the limitations of aesthetic categories rooted in cultural values as it focuses attention on the objective characteristics of the objects and systems in question. It not only avoids aesthetic subjectivism and the problems associated with social customs but also demonstrates how one's aesthetic judgment can proceed based on the robust foundation provided by the natural sciences.

Shifting his attention to the built environment, Carlson applies cognitivism to large-scale farms, that is, to landscapes that are dedicated to the production of staple crops.⁴ Viewers often respond negatively to these landscapes since they are bland and monotonous—they are often viewed as “blandscapes”. Carlson suggests that this judgment is common since many viewers unreflectively draw on social customs that dictate that an aesthetically pleasing farm is one that is characteristically quaint, charming, and serene, that is, one that can be characterized as pastoral.⁵

This presents an issue of scale since quaintness is an aesthetic property that simply cannot be applied to mega-farms. This difficulty can also be found when one takes into account the tools and equipment that populate the respective farms, for the pastoral farm often include rustic fences, barns and small-scale farm equipment however, the mega-farm includes enormous silos and large machines that water and reap expansive rows of crops. Such equipment magnifies the vastness of the mega-farm and further undermines aesthetic approval. As with the swamp

³ See *Ibid.*, pp. 85-94.

⁴ See “Appreciating Agricultural Landscapes” in *Ibid.*, pp. 175-193.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-177.

mentioned a moment ago, the inappropriate application of a cultural standard to a different kind of landscape produces inappropriate aesthetic judgment. Because of its magnitude, the landscape cannot stand up to the standard set by the charming pastoral farm.

On the contrary, Carlson argues that landscapes must be viewed in light of the necessary functions that they perform.⁶ That is, cognitivism implores us to see that large-scale farms are well-designed and efficient *functional* landscapes that are dedicated to a necessary end, namely, the production of food and fiber necessary for human survival. If we become cognizant of commonly held cultural standards and begin to consider the objective functionality of such landscapes we will judge them as being rich in aesthetic value. The landscape will no longer appear so bland since its magnitude and lack of aesthetic variation will be seen as being intertwined with the efficient realization of a necessary end.

II

Ned Hettinger has noted that Carlson's argument concerning the aesthetic value of the landscape troubles some environmentalists as it appears to entail the aesthetic approval of an unsustainable farming practice.⁷ That is, judging the modern mega-farm as being aesthetically good implicitly sanctions a farming practice that contributes to degraded soil and water quality as well as soil erosion. Indeed, it is odd that Carlson would argue for the aesthetic goodness of the landscape since a more robust cognitivism that draws on ecological science would not be so quick to advocate for the aesthetic goodness of the mega-farm. That is, the efficient functionality that Carlson champions would be called into question by a more robust ecological

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 185-189.

⁷ See "Allen Carlson's Environmental Aesthetics and the Protection of the Environment" in *Environmental Ethics* 27:11 (2005), pp. 57-76.

evaluation of such farms. Hettinger goes on to suggest that there may be ways around this problem⁸ but regardless, it leads me to consider the relationship between aesthetic cognitivism and environmental ethics.

More specifically, Hettinger's point raises two important issues: (1) the relationship between cognitivism, ethical, and aesthetic value and (2) the depth of ecological understanding necessary for aesthetic appreciation of the natural environment. I will consider (1) here and (2) at the end of section three.

As discussed, social customs often inform aesthetic judgment however, an understanding of environmental functional complexity can inform them as well. In an oft-quoted passage Aldo Leopold observes that environmental beauty is intertwined with harmoniously functioning environmental processes, that is, an awareness of points of connection between the parts of an ecosystem provides the observer with a sense of a dynamic whole.⁹ It not only offers an understanding of "unity in variety" but also attunes one to aesthetic properties commonly associated with effective functionality including simplicity, surprise, robustness, and responsiveness. Indeed, the sense of awe that arises in response to the intricate relationship between part and whole can arise in response to works of art but I would suggest that this sense is more pronounced in environmental contexts since many of the components are living organisms and the processes that connect them are necessary for their sustenance.

Some have also followed Leopold in suggesting that an understanding of the natural world also grounds moral concern. Briefly, knowledge of a complex web of life hinders a

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-64.

⁹ That is, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community." *A Sand County Almanac* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 224-225.

narrow instrumentalism that is often invoked in justifying environmental degradation. That is, it is difficult to view the natural world simply as a resource if one understands how intertwined and mutually dependent the objects within it—including oneself—are. As Callicott notes, ecological understanding encourages individuals to recognize that the moral community includes the land and the creatures that live in it.¹⁰

I would like to go a step further by considering in more detail how an understanding of the environment fosters the intertwining of aesthetic and ethical value. Focusing on works of art, Robert Stecker has pointed out the relationship between aesthetic and ethical value can move in two directions and it seems that it does so as well in environmental contexts.¹¹ That is, with regard to both art and the environment, aesthetic value can produce ethical value (a—e) and ethical value can produce aesthetic value (e—a).

The a—e relationship has thoroughly been discussed in environmental aesthetics under the “beauty to duty” rubric.¹² The premises of arguments for this relationship differ however the conclusion is the same, namely, aesthetic value produces a sense that the environment—whether it be to preserve the intrinsic value or to guarantee future appreciation by human beings—should be preserved. That is, the beauty of nature produces something of a conservation imperative.

The e—a relationship is discussed less often but figures prominently in experiences associated with landscapes shaped by human effort. Indeed, it can be found in Carlson’s argument for the appreciation of mega-farms, for he suggests that their necessity encourages the

¹⁰ J. Baird Callicott (ed.), *Companion to a Sand Country Almanac: Interpretive and Critical Essays* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 239.

¹¹ “The Interaction of Ethical and Aesthetic Value” in *British Journal of Aesthetics* 45:2 (April, 2005), pp. 138-139.

¹² For an array of essays on this topic see Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (eds.), *Nature, Aesthetics, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

knowledgeable observer to view them with a spirit of seriousness that fosters aesthetic appreciation of their magnitude. Here, the notion of sustenance is at the root of the appreciation of the mega-farm.

Similarly, in “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings”, William James describes a trip to the American South and his reactions to a North Carolina farmer who clear-cut a significant portion of his farm.¹³ James thought that the clear-cut was atrocious but then learned that the farmer found it aesthetically appealing since he saw it as expressing a certain work ethic indeed, the Protestant work ethic that James also espoused. The aesthetic of tidiness and neatness that characterizes many suburban lawns and gardens is likewise rooted in an ethic of hard work. In either case, aesthetic properties are viewed as expressing certain ethical values.

The development of aesthetic value in light of ethical value can arise in the natural environment as well. Of course, if one had a religious bent and saw the natural world as being “God’s handiwork” then one may see it as expressing the goodness of such making however, even if one does not espouse this world-view, one may gain insight into one’s dependence on environmental processes and may consequently view aesthetic goodness in light of sustenance. The farm sets the context for an ethico-aesthetic appreciation of the fecundity of the earth and this kind of appreciation can develop when one gains an understanding of the complex of environmental systems that supports one’s being. Of course, this kind of appreciation is hindered by technological mediation since technology obscures awareness of sustaining biotic relationships. For example, the faucet that effortlessly brings pure water to my glass makes it difficult for me to appreciating the system of rivers and streams that brings the water to my city

¹³ In Frederick H. Burkhardt (ed.), *The Works of William James: Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 132-149.

in the first place. Regardless, an understanding of dependence on the natural world is an ethical understanding that pertains to human well-being and this can produce a sense of awe and wonder that pertains to the earth's fecundity.

The foregoing also demonstrates the role that cognitivism can play in fostering the integration on of aesthetic and ethical value. Knowledge of natural history and environmental science fosters an understanding of functional complexity and the contingency of life, human or otherwise. Cognitivism fosters the transition from "beauty to duty" (a—e) as it encourages one to see natural objects and systems for the functionally complex entities and processes that they are. This can expand the boundaries of one's moral community. Cognitivism also fosters the transition from "duty to beauty" (e—a) as it creates an awareness of mutual dependency and ultimately an awareness of the contingency of all life.

Before closing this section I should emphasize that cognitivism is not the only approach that fosters the integration of aesthetic and ethical value. Emily Brady's Kantian emphasis on disinterested appreciation of the natural environment also fosters ethico-aesthetic appreciation since it entails distancing oneself from personal interests and focusing attention on the object of appreciation.¹⁴ Indeed, a disinterested attitude can play a role in both ethics and aesthetics for holding one's personal interests in check allows one to more objectively examine a moral problem and can keep one from having one's aesthetic appreciation be guided by the "charm" of the object in question.

I allude to Brady's account of aesthetic experience since it provides a foundation for her criticism of cognitivism. Indeed, she advances two criticisms that need to be addressed, namely, an objection that concerns the relationship between intellectual concepts and aesthetic properties

¹⁴ See her *Aesthetics of the Natural Environment* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003), pp. 191-223.

and one that concerns the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.

III

Briefly, Brady argues that scientific knowledge appears to be at odds with aesthetic perception. She writes, “It strikes me as odd to claim that scientific knowledge is essential for appreciating nature *aesthetically*”¹⁵ and that “scientific knowledge may be a good starting point for appreciation characterized by curiosity, wonder, and awe, but is it necessary for perceiving aesthetic qualities?”¹⁶

This reflects the commonsense worry that aesthetic perception can get along just fine without scientific concepts ever coming into play. For example, I may appreciate the tulips in my front yard without ever considering the fact that their attractive colors, textures, and shapes are in fact conducive to luring pollinating insects. I may just simply enjoy their beauty without such conceptual matters ever coming to the fore. Brady’s criticism is rooted in the belief that aesthetic appreciation is primarily a perceptual affair that should remain free from intellectual concerns. On this account, biological, ecological, or geological concepts have little to do with aesthetic appreciation of natural objects.

I am sympathetic to this line of reasoning since it resonates with the intuition that aesthetic experience should be based in qualitative immediacy and should not be mediated by concepts. Indeed, one can imagine the extreme (and likely unrealistic) case of a natural scientist who is incapable of fully appreciating the beauty of a flower because his or her experience is so

¹⁵ “Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature” in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 56:2 (Spring 1998), p. 140.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

thoroughly mediated by scientific concepts. There are two ways to respond to this worry.

The first is to note that all aesthetic experience is mediated by certain fundamental concepts. Appreciating the beauty of a tulip entails seeing it as a tulip (that is, as a kind of flower) and not as, say, an animal. Brady would not disagree since the concepts that allow us to judge natural objects “as x” are not properly scientific concepts. Hence, this answer only begs the question but I advance it since it provides insight into the manner in which concepts and perceptual qualities intertwine as an aesthetic experience unfolds.

Upon walking out my front door and seeing brightly colored flowers, I implicitly identify them as tulips but then go on to focus on their distinctive features. That is, once I have identified them as tulips I take in their forms and colors and even the way that they lilt with a certain easy grace in the morning breeze. If I then consider what I have learned about flowers and pollination, then my experience will be momentarily mediated by concepts however, as before, once the concept has developed, I will return to the tulips with a renewed and more robust appreciation of their perceptual qualities. Their colors and forms will be more significant when they are seen in light of the pollination process, strategies for survival, biological adaptation, and so on.

At this point Brady can respond by re-emphasizing her point that the awareness of strategies for attracting pollinating insects does not pertain to the perceptual qualities of the tulips *per se* but merely contextualizes the appreciation of those qualities. In response, it will be remembered that, in the previous section, I noted that Carlson emphasizes functionality when considering large-scale farms and that doing so allows him to draw attention to the aesthetic properties that correspond with efficient functioning. A landscape is a functional entity whether it is used by human beings to produce food or it is simply left to its own devices. The farm is a

functional landscape as are those that are freer from human interference for, in either case, the landscape performs the function of sustaining life.

Individual organisms—such as the tulips in my front yard—too are functional entities in that they seek to grow and reproduce. Further, functionality is the foundation for aesthetic properties that are expressed in the form of the organism. Following Guyer, Parsons writes, “knowing the function of the object, we can see that its shapes and pattern have virtues of good design.”¹⁷ He continues by observing that the virtues of good design are *simplicity* (having no extraneous properties), *surprise* (fulfilling the function in an unexpected way), *robustness* (the capacity to perform the function in different ways) and *responsiveness* (the ability to adapt to different circumstances).

The form of a tulip, I would argue, is primarily characterized by its functional simplicity. It expresses a certain elegance as it has a simple form and a relatively simple color scheme. Further, and contra Brady, a deeper understanding of pollination strategies provides a context for the appreciation of the tulip’s simplicity or, to put it another way, functional aesthetic properties such as simplicity come to the fore when the ends that they are intertwined with are kept in mind. The tulip’s simplicity is based in the observation that it meets its end in a manner that does not involve extraneous properties. Indeed, the form of a tulip can be seen as manifesting simplicity (especially if other more complex flowers are kept in mind) without taking function into account however, following Carlson, I would argue that it must be judged for what it is, namely, a functional object that strives to actualize its ends. Once this is taken into account, simplicity will not be an abstract aesthetic property but will be seen as intertwined with the life of the organism

¹⁷ “Natural Functions and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Inorganic Nature” in the *British Journal of Aesthetics* 44:1 (January 2004), p. 52. Also see Paul Guyer, “Free and Adherent Beauty: A Modest Proposal” in *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42:4 (2002), pp. 357-366.

in question.

Other examples could be given that would demonstrate the relationship between cognitivism and aesthetic properties that express functionality. One could go on to choose organisms whose functioning brings the other aesthetic properties to the fore [for example, the *surprise* that characterizes the Venus fly-trap (*Dionea muscipula*), the *responsiveness* that characterizes the Roridula plant (*Roridula gorgonias*) the *robustness* that characterizes the Creosote bush (*Larrea tridentata*)]¹⁸ but the conclusion would be the same, namely, nature is imbued with aesthetic qualities that pertain to the functional nature of natural objects and processes and further, since cognitivism increases one's understanding of natural functions, it consequently has the ability to increase the significance of such qualities. For this reason, aesthetic appreciation can be seen as a dialectic of percepts and concepts that can be enriched by the natural sciences.

The second objection advanced by Brady directly concerns the relationship between environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics. She takes the position of a moderate moral autonomist, a position that does not mesh with the intertwining of moral and aesthetic value that I advocated in the last section.¹⁸ That is, in keeping with her stance on disinterestedness and the freedom of aesthetic experience, Brady argues for a moderate autonomism that avoids aestheticism (which holds that aesthetic evaluation is immune from moral evaluation) but emphasizes that aesthetic and moral value are distinct species of value. To put it another way, on her account, since aesthetic and moral value have different foundations, one must resist a moralist position which would hold that it is at least sometimes appropriate to construe a moral

¹⁸ The Venus fly-trap captures insects, the Roridula plant processes nutrients from its roots and sustains sustenance from a symbiotic relationship with an insect (*Pameridea roridulae*), and the Creosote bush is known for its ability to thrive in harsh desert conditions.

flaw as an aesthetic flaw.

Brady believes that moral and aesthetic value have different foundations since she believes that ethics is primarily a cognitive affair. She writes

Moral value is primarily concerned with making choices about how one ought to act, and how one ought to treat humans and the rest of nature. This is not to say that moral considerations are not part of our aesthetic experiences, nor that aesthetic considerations are not part of moral deliberation. But aesthetic and moral value are nevertheless distinct and require judgment on their own terms.¹⁹

She illustrates the distinction by suggesting that one may wish to support the eradication of invasive species on moral grounds but that it would not be inconsistent to continue to find the species aesthetically appealing.

I would first respond by questioning the construal of moral experience as being primarily cognitive in nature. Of course, moral life does have a cognitive dimension since the process of examining an ethical problem and coming up with possible solutions to it necessarily involves cognitive processes however, moral experience goes well beyond this as imagination, emotion, habit, and other psychological factors can come into play as well. Cognition need not take the lead role and, indeed, the array of internal factors that can come into play is what renders one's moral life interestingly challenging and at times terribly difficult to live out. But since this can be debated, let's ignore this point.

In order to render her autonomism moderate, Brady later suggests that environmental

¹⁹ See Brady (2003), pp. 224-267.

ethics and aesthetics may work hand-in-hand²⁰ and this leads me to question the viability of moderate autonomism as it unfolds within environmental aesthetics. As discussed, moderate autonomism holds that aesthetic and moral value are conceptually distinct forms of value but also holds that they can influence one another in certain circumstances. I believe that Brady is at pains to have it both ways since she puts priority on environmental conservation and holds that environmental aesthetics can play an important role in such efforts²¹ but also holds that aesthetic and moral value must remain distinct.

Indeed, I would argue that moderate autonomism is a coherent way of conceiving the relationship between moral and aesthetic value when we are *in the domain of art proper* and that Brady runs into difficulties when she leaves that domain and attempts to apply it to environmental aesthetics. With regard to works of art, James C. Anderson and Jeffrey T. Dean argue that moderate autonomism avoids a morally questionable aestheticism and respects the conceptual difference between moral and aesthetic value that is important to consider when evaluating paintings, novels, or plays.²² Respecting that difference precludes one from narrowly construing the work of art in moral terms.

However, it is difficult to see how moderate autonomism can coherently be applied to the natural environment given that the environment is not an artifact intentionally produced by an artist to elicit aesthetic experience from an audience. Instead, it is constituted by a network of living creatures and the processes and substances that sustain them. This essential difference, I would argue renders any form of autonomism inappropriate, inappropriate because the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-260.

²² "Moderate Autonomism" in the *British Journal of Aesthetics* 38:2 (1998), pp. 150-166.

environment is ontologically distinct from a work of art and because it has the direct capacity to affect quality of life—human or otherwise. To return to Brady’s example, one can appreciate the beauty of an invasive plant species but in doing so one aestheticizes the plant and ignores the fact that it constitutes a threat to native plant species and that its presence may be indicative of larger ecological changes that can affect the overall environment health. Except in the most extreme cases, a work of art cannot pose this kind of environmental threat.

For this reason, moderate autonomism collapses into autonomism which, as Brady suggests, is at odds with environmental ethics since it irresponsibly ignores the environmental consequences of aesthetic appreciation. Hence, one must choose between a moralism that stresses the ethical implications of aesthetic valuing or an autonomism that construes aesthetic appreciation as altogether immune to such implications.

This leads us to (2), the question raised at the end of section two concerning the depth of one’s cognitivism. At this point we can frame that question in light of the integration of moral and aesthetic value or, more specifically, we can address the question regarding just how strong of a moralist one should be. Is a moderate position possible or should one insist that moral value always trumps aesthetic value?

The reader may have noted that I have said much about environmental ethics but have said little or nothing about the particular environmental ethic that one espouses. I have framed environmental ethics as a general concern for the natural world and the things within it but have said nothing about the content of the beliefs that contextualize that concern. Indeed, such content needs to be considered as it determines the strength of one’s moral concern and consequently influences the depth of one’s aesthetic appreciation.

More specifically, we find that the restrictions on aesthetic appreciation will grow

stronger as the scope of concern expands away from the self. That is, assuming they are consistent in their belief, the aesthetic appreciations of the egoist, utilitarian, biocentrist, and ecocentrist will differ since they have varying levels of moral concern for the environment. The egoist may enjoy the beauty of an invasive plant species and care little about native species and/or biotic diversity whereas the ecocentrist may have difficulty appreciating the aesthetic properties of the plant in question because he or she will take the full array of environmental factors into account. Hence, the depth of one's cognitivism and the strength of one's aesthetic moralism are determined by the particular environmental ethic that one espouses.

With this said, a troubling issue arises for those who advocate a robust environmental moralism (such as the ecocentrist) for the position seems to entail that *all* aesthetic experience will be morally tainted.²³ That is, given the lack of pristine wilderness and the comprehensive nature of the effect of humanity on the natural environment it will be difficult for aesthetic appreciation to develop in any significant way. As illustrated by the environmentalist's criticism of Carlson's argument concerning mega-farms, a robust cognitivism will eventually find troubling environmental degradation that one should be concerned about and such concerns will likely detract from aesthetic appreciation. As Cheryl Foster discusses, in modern contexts, one will often be subject to "aesthetic disillusionments" where what one thought was beautiful turns out to be part and parcel of environmental degradation.²⁴

I do not think that this is should be much of a worry since many people are drawn into and are sustained in caring for the natural environment by rich aesthetic experiences that cannot be undermined by a robust cognitivism/moralism. Even if environmental degradation is constant

²³ See her "Aesthetic Disillusionment: Environment, Ethics, Art" in *Environmental Values* 1 (1992), pp. 205-215.

²⁴ I would like to thank Steven Fesmire for bringing this my attention.

and awareness of it is high, the beauty of individual organisms, species, and ecosystems will still be appreciated as they strive to function. That is, one will still appreciate the aesthetic properties associated with form and function even if the entities that manifest them are threatened.

In conclusion, I have shown that cognitivism provides a rich foundation not only for aesthetic appreciation in environmental contexts but also for the appreciation of the rich array of value that the environment offers.